Posted by
Dawnsblood on Friday, January 19, 2007 5:20:46 PM
Bill Roggio is back in Anbar and chronicles
the rebirth of a local IA unit, the 3/3-1 Iraqi Army.
In conversations with Lt Col Mohammed and Major West, they explained
the history of the 3/3-1, which they both felt was important in
understanding the development of the unit and its place in the fight
today. The unit possessed experience and leadership in the officer
corps. The officers and many of the enlisted fought against the U.S. in
the Gulf War in 1991, during Operation Desert Fox in 1998, and during
the Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. The unit was considered to be an
elite fighting force, superior to Saddam Hussein's Republican Guard.
“This Iraqi Army battalion has a positive, martial attitude,” said
Major West.
During the 2003 invasion, the battalion dropped its weapons and
faded back into the civilian population, awaiting the call to reform
after the fighting was over. “The call never came,” said Major West,
which he said was a critical error made by the Coalition Provisional
Authority, led by Paul Bremer. The unit maintained its social network
and reformed after the failure and collapse of the Iraqi National Guard
in 2004. The 3rd Brigade of the 1st Iraqi Army Division was the first
unit to form up under General Petreaus' order to reconstitute the Iraqi
Army.
The 3/3-1 trained in Taji and fought heavy battles in Mosul during
2004, where they “learned what it was like to fight offensively,” said
Major West. “We fought on both the east and west sides of the city, and
the fighting was tough,” said LtCol Mohammed, “But it prepared and
hardened us.” In Mosul, the 3/3-1 also established what Major West
calls “a predator-prey relationship,” an aggressive, offensive mindset
which is vital to control security out here in Anbar province. A
passive security posture is viewed as weakness by the local population,
and serves only to encourage the insurgency. The battalion conducts
multiple patrols, raids and security operations on a daily basis, and
conducts the intelligence gathering and planning for these missions.
They work closely with the Iraqi Police in the region, and conduct
joint operations. Like other Iraqi battalions, their weakness lies in
their ability to sustain logistics and pay their soldiers on a regular
basis.